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The Tourism Market’s response to the 2009 Black 
Saturday Bushfires: the case of Gippsland 
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Summary 
The primary aim of the research was to better understand how a large scale disaster 
impacts upon the tourist’s destination image and visitation intentions, and the role of the 
media. Focus group research reveals the post-disaster media interpretations, images and 
visitation intentions of intrastate and interstate, regional and metropolitan tourists. 
Differences are observed in relation to the participants’ geographic location and distance 
from the fires and their understanding of the event, including their reflections on media 
coverage. Varying perceptions among the participants, of the impact of the fires and the 
travel risk and subsequent travel intentions to the region, are discussed. 
KEYWORDS; Disaster recovery marketing, destination image, media impacts, Black Saturday 
Bushfires 
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ABSTRACT 
One of the key roles of a destination marketing organisation (DMO) is to portray their 
destination in such a way that it is both appealing and inviting to their existing and potential 
tourism market. A challenge faced by a DMO in the regional Victorian destination of 
Gippsland in Australia, is the fact that they also have to manage unanticipated sudden 
changes in market perceptions that may occur in response to a disastrous event. The 
reoccurring natural disasters of this region (fires, floods and drought) – the most recent 
being the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires, deemed Australia’s worst natural disaster in 
history, make it imperative that DMOs can respond effectively. This paper presents the 
findings of an exploratory research project designed to investigate the tourism market’s 
response to this particular disastrous event. The primary aim of the research was to better 
understand how a large scale disaster impacts upon the tourist’s destination image and 
visitation intentions, and the role of the media in these deliberations. Focus group research 
reveals the post-disaster media interpretations, images and visitation intentions of 
intrastate and interstate, regional and metropolitan tourists. Differences are observed in 
relation to the participants’ geographic location and distance from the fires and their 
understandings of the event, including their reflections on media coverage. Varying 
perceptions among the participants, of the impact of the fires, the travel risk and 
subsequent travel intentions are discussed. Managerial implications relating to media 
management and the refinement of future disaster management strategies are also 
presented. 
KEYWORDS. Disaster recovery marketing, destination image, media interpretation, Black 
Saturday Bushfires 
 
INTRODUCTION 
GIPPSLAND AND THE 2009 BLACK SATURDAY BUSHFIRES  
The February 2009 Black Saturday bushfires have been defined as Australia’s worst natural 
disaster ever, with as many as 400 individual fires burning across the state of Victoria on the 
one day. It is estimated that these fires destroyed in excess of 3500 structures, over 200 
lives and displaced more than 7500 people. A total of 78 towns throughout the state were 
affected, many of which had a high dependency on tourism.  
Gippsland, located in South East Victoria (see Figure 1) positions itself as one of Victoria’s 
primary nature-based destinations and plays host to a number of internationally recognised 
nature-based attractions. These natural attractions require the support of local tourism 
industry stakeholders to accommodate, entertain and attract both national and 
international visitors. Gippsland’s tourism industry is dominated by small family-owned 
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businesses and its recognition for being a lucrative and viable industry for Gippsland is 
demonstrated by its annual local economic contribution of AUD$688 million (Tourism 
Victoria, 2007). Despite the fact that only a comparatively small proportion of the region 
(2.5%) was affected by the events of Black Saturday, the 2009 Bushfires presented 
Gippsland’s tourism industry with an estimated income loss in excess of $44 million. Much 
of this loss was attributed to a steep decline in visitor numbers and a steady stream of 
cancellations of present and future reservations, as far as 12 months in advance 
(Destination Gippsland Ltd, 2009). The main areas affected by the fires were Churchill, a 
small township located in the Latrobe Valley shire, and Wilson’s Promontory, one of 
Gippsland’s leading nature based tourism sites. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
The Churchill fires were deliberately lit by an arsonist, who on a 46°(Celsius) total fire ban 
day, ignited a fire in a pine plantation one kilometre south east of Churchill at approximately 
1:30pm. By late afternoon the fire travelled south-east towards the South Gippsland 
coastline and as a result of a strong wind change travelled in a north-easterly direction, 
destroying 57 homes and 11 lives that stood in its path. Five hundred people were 
evacuated to the nearby township of Traralgon in the shire’s Latrobe Valley (Jackson, 2009). 
Two days later, the Churchill fires were still burning out of control through the Latrobe 
Valley area and the neighbouring Strzelecki and Jeeralang ranges, destroying a total of 323 
square kilometres of bush land, nature reserves and properties (Australian Broadcasting 
Commission, 2009). 
The Wilson’s Promontory fire was lit by a lightning strike on the day after Black Saturday. 
This bushfire, driven by winds of up 70 kilometres per hour, burnt 25 200ha over five weeks, 
which was close to 50% of the national park. Wilson’s promontory is one of Victoria’s 
signature national parks. Positioned at the southern most point of the Australian mainland, 
the park hosts the largest coastal wilderness area in Victoria (Parks Victoria, 2009). Campers 
and lodgers were evacuated from the park at the time of the fires and the park remained 
closed for 41 days.  
The call for this research was prompted by a distinct lack of knowledge among the 
Gippsland tourism industry about how Gippsland and its national parks were positioned in 
the minds of the tourists in the wake of the 2009 bushfires. Gippsland presents an 
interesting and unique context for this research due to its classification as a destination 
likely to experience recurring disasters (Destination Gippsland Ltd, 2009) and its location 
within Victoria – formerly identified as ‘one of the most bushfire-prone places on Earth’ 
(Parks Victoria and DSE, 2007: 29). Previous investigations into the impact of natural 
disasters on tourism destinations per se, have included, the impact on the destination and 
its stakeholders (Cioccio & Michael, 2007; Roman, 2008) commentary on the destination’s 
response and recovery efforts (Armstrong & Ritchie, 2007; Ritchie, 2008) and disaster 
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management (Blackman & Ritchie, 2007), however the literature remains relatively scarce. 
In particular there is a dearth of information on how a destination’s tourism market is likely 
to respond when a familiar tourist destination is struck by disaster. Prideau, Coghlan and 
Falco-Mammone (2007) claim that while one may be able to broadly predict likely disasters 
via observable trends such as weather patterns and similar historical events, the impact on 
industries such as tourism can only be assessed on a case by case basis. The authors suggest 
that the compilation of case studies that record the tourism market’s behavioural responses 
is one method of establishing precedents that advocate how destination marketers can 
respond to disastrous events. . Ritchie (2008) supports this position claiming that knowledge 
from previous disasters can assist in the development of effective prevention and readiness 
strategies for future events. Carlson and Hughes (2007) suggest that a better understanding 
of market trends likely to emerge after a disastrous event can provide a more realistic 
picture of the market oriented responses and opportunities for destinations post-disaster. 
 
DISASTROUS EVENTS AND DESTINATION IMAGE  
Mass tourism has been impacted by crises and disasters for nearly five decades and almost 
no tourism destination can be fully exempt from disaster (Beirman, 2006). Faulkner (2001)_ 
defines a tourism disaster as a situation in which “a tourism destination is confronted with 
sudden, unpredictable, catastrophic changes over which it has little control”(p136). The 
management of negative destination brand associations that can occur as a consequence of 
tourism disasters represents a significant challenge for tourism destination marketers 
(Lehto, Douglas and Park, 2007) and critical to their success, is an understanding of the 
intervening effect that disasters have on the tourist’s destination image formation. 
Tourist destination image is defined by Crompton (1979, p408) as “the sum of beliefs, ideas 
and impressions that a person has of a destination”. The importance of a tourist’s 
destination image is universally acknowledged given its influence on the tourist’s decision 
process and ultimately their destination choice (Pearlman and Melnik, 2008; Chon, 1991; 
Baloglu and McCleary; 1999; Jenkins, 1999; Mayo, 1975; Leisen 2001) and visitation 
likelihood (Lepp and Gibson, 2003). According to Leisen (2001) the tourist creates an image 
by collecting and processing information about a destination over time. This information is 
eventually organised into a mental construct that in some way becomes meaningful to the 
individual. In effect, reality becomes secondary as the tourist’s perceptions prevail in 
consideration of their destination choice (Guthrie and Gale, 1991).  
From a marketing perspective, information sources such as the mass media are viewed as 
an external stimulus likely to influence image formation. For example, Beirman, (2003) 
argues that whilst the mass media’s role is to generate awareness, it also holds significant 
power in relation to the shaping of perceptions not only about the extent of a disastrous 
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event, but also about the destination in which in the event takes place. Further, the impact 
can be moderated over time by the phenomenon known as issue-attention (Hall, 2002), 
where there is often a wane in coverage of a disaster, by the media and by politicians.  
According to Armstrong & Ritchie (2007) the global availability of media can rapidly lead to 
the formation of negative perceptions of a disaster affected destination. Given the global 
nature of the tourism product, those regions hit by disasters are likely to experience 
significant issues related to the destination’s marketability. Pearlman and Melnik (2008) for 
example report on the lasting undesirable effect the media coverage had on New Orleans’ 
tourism industry in the wake of Hurricane Katrina which consequently resulted in the closing 
of over 1400 tourism related businesses. The 2004 Tsunami that hit Indonesia, Thailand and 
other nations that border the Indian Ocean generated vast amounts of sensationalised 
media coverage that focused on the death and destruction that resulted in a significant 
downturn in tourist arrivals (Prideaux et al, 2007).  As Huang, Tseng and Petrick (2007) 
claim, the mass media can cause a significant level of unwarranted anxiety among potential 
travellers as media-reliant tourists tend not to independently evaluate the reality behind 
such reporting of an event. It is critical for destination marketing organisations to 
understand the tourist’s media usage and interpretation when a disaster occurs.  
 
PURPOSE 
Using the Gippsland region and the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires as the context, this 
research aims to investigate the  tourism market’s response to three key concerns-  
• media interpretation  
• post disaster destination image and  
• visitation intentions during and after the fires.  
The incorporation of four distinct visitor markets in the study – inter and intrastate and 
metropolitan and regional – differentiates this research and extends the design of the study 
to explore the influence of factors such as geographical proximity, past experience and 
knowledge of the event, via different media sources on the tourists’ responses to the 2009 
disaster.  
METHODOLOGY 
Project design: Because the research is exploratory in nature and theoretically little is 
known about the topic in question, focus groups were considered to be the best possible 
approach. Four focus groups were conducted to explore the areas of interest to this 
research. According to Marshall and Rossman (1995) one of the prime advantages of focus 
groups is that the format allows the researcher to further explore unanticipated issues as 
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they arise in the discussion. The focus group method also allows the researcher to easily 
assess the extent to which the views of participants are relatively consistent both within a 
group and between groups (Patton, 1999). Given that the research focus encompassed a 
topic area that was surrounded by a certain degree of social trauma, it was also deemed to 
be important to allow the participants to narrate and describe their recollections of the 
bushfires and consequent opinions in their own terms.  
One of the most common criticisms directed towards focus group methods, particularly 
within the marketing literature, is the small sample sizes which in turn lead to doubts 
regarding validity (Reed and Payton, 1997). However, as Reissman (2002) warns, a more 
structured research inquiry open to larger sample sizes can sometimes interrupt and 
‘fracture’ the story telling  of experiences to agree with the expected outcomes anticipated 
by the researcher.  
Morgan (1996) cites, whilst individual interviews can be a more effective means for 
generating ideas and surveys are certainly a more effective method for determining the 
extent of any given attitude or experience (Ward, Berntrand and Brown, 1992), a unique 
strength of focus groups lies in their ability to provide insight into the extent of consensus 
and diversity among a group of people. Via ‘the group effect’, a focus group discussion 
allows the researcher to observe the interactions between participants as they query and 
explain their views to each other which consequently exhibits the amount of consensus 
among the group. This was of particular importance to the current research given its 
comparative nature.  
Locations: The focus groups took place in Melbourne, Regional Victoria (Geelong), Sydney 
and Country NSW(Wagga). Interstate (metropolitan and regional) and intrastate 
(metropolitan and regional) areas were included as the researchers wished to determine if 
there were differences among the four geographically defined market segments. This 
sampling design offers two basic advantages. First, it builds a comparative element into the 
research project, which in the case of the current study was essential to the goals and 
objectives of the research. Second, segmenting or categorising participants can better 
facilitate discussions as participants are more alike and less likely to express differing points 
of view (Morgan, 1996; Tynan & Drayton, 1988).  To ensure a high level of comparability 
across the four groups, a standardised research design was employed (Morgan, (1996).  
Whilst Orosz (1994) criticises that the use of identical question schedules across a number 
of focus groups defies the key tenets of qualitative research, Morgan (1996) argues that 
method-based decisions should be based on the goals of the particular research as opposed 
to past tradition. The researchers were therefore confident about their chosen research 
design. 
Sample frame: Destination Gippsland’s consumer database was used as the sampling pool 
from which the participants were recruited. Those listed on the data base were identified as 
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tourists who have an interest in and / or are likely to visit Gippsland for tourism purposes. 
An email was sent to the 2000 people listed on the database seeking expressions of interest 
and a total of 160 people responded, from which 31 participants were recruited. The 
regional locations were determined by the number of responses from a particular area, the 
most represented regions being South West Victoria and NSW’s Riverina Region. Nine 
people participated in the Melbourne session, 6 in the Sydney session, 8 in the Riverina 
session (Wagga) and 8 in the South West Victoria(Geelong) session.  
Data collection: The number of participants in each group was consistent with Krueger and 
Casey’s (2000) recommendation of between six and ten participants. Gender and age 
categories were generally well represented in the groups, although the Melbourne group 
was dominated by people aged over 40. The average length of the sessions was ninety 
minutes. Participants were reimbursed for their travel and any other expenses incurred as a 
result of their participation each receiving a maximum of $70. The sessions took place at 
purpose built meeting facilities centrally located at each of the four locations. All four 
sessions were facilitated by the primary researcher. Ethical clearance was sought and 
received to conduct the research. 
The focus group sessions were recorded and transcribed by a professional transcription 
agency. According to Robson (1993) the central aim of data analysis is data reduction. The 
data analysis process therefore began with examining and categorising the four transcripts 
in alignment with the themes central to the study’s objectives. The basis for establishing 
these themes was taken from a review of related tourism literature in combination with 
industry needs.  
Data Analysis 
To ensure the minimisation of potential bias often associated with the analysis and 
interpretation of focus group data, Krueger and Casey (2000) recommend that the analysis 
be systematic, sequential, verifiable and continuous. Lincoln and Guba (1989) agree that 
following this path can strengthen the dependability, conformity and consistency of the 
data. The researchers adopted Krueger and Casey’s recommendations and the data were 
therefore subjected to the following process.  
A systematic approach to the analysis of large files of text data from focus groups is 
essential, to providing a transparent evidence trail of the process used for the selection of 
representative quotations, a fair mix of participants and the identification of views that fall 
outside the mainstream on the discussion. According to Rabiee (2004, p657), such an 
approach allows for verification of findings, ‘…safeguards against selective perception and 
increases the rigour of the study’. The sequential process outlined here, ensures a verifiable 
record of each continuous step. Each focus group transcript, with every line of text 
numbered, and each quotation coded to indicate the participant, was first analysed 
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separately. Representative quotations that best captured the group’s perception of the issue 
were copied and pasted by geographic source, into the data file, including the line numbers 
and participant code from the original transcript. All line numbers and participant codes 
were retained and included in the final presentation of data indicating their source from the 
original transcript.  
A second revision of selections was made, due to the large body of data first selected. The 
same process was repeated, of selecting, copying and bolding before pasting into the final 
draft file. Again a trail of evidence is available in this systematic, sequential approach. The 
final refinement of data requires a further data reduction, achieved by comparing and 
contrasting similar quotations (Rabiee, 2004), capturing representative examples, excluding 
any text that does not add to the representation of the group’s narrative story and 
interpreting the key aspects of most importance to each group. This stage, described by 
Ritchie and Spencer (1994)  as indexing, captures the essence of systematic focus group 
analysis, the ‘…sifting the data, highlighting and sorting out quotes and making comparisons 
both within and between cases’ (Rabiee, 2004, p657).  
The focus group data will be presented within the themes designated in the research design. 
 
DATA PRESENTATION: FOCUS GROUP THEMES 
Media Interpretation 
The media usage by participants during the event included all main media sources across 
the four focus groups. However media usage did vary between the interstate and intrastate 
groups. In Sydney, participants referred mostly to newspapers and television as the source 
for their information, with one participant actively seeking information from the Internet. In 
regional NSW, people turned to Melbourne Newspapers and Television, and the Country 
Fire Authority (CFA) Website for their information.  
Prior to investigating the tourist’s interpretation of the media coverage of the event, it was 
considered important to gain an understanding of their perceived credibility of the media at 
the time of fires.  Participants were prompted during the focus group session to indicate the 
level of trust they have in the media - talking especially about the reporting of the 2009 
Bushfires. The responses were similar across the four locations with many participants 
agreeing that the initial reporting (first 48 hours) was considered responsible and 
trustworthy.  
As time went on, intrastate tourists felt that the media started to sensationalise the events 
as illustrated in the following comments: 
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... the first 48 hours were impressive reporting but then it was over kill and by 
the end of the first week I couldn't watch it anymore on TV or listen to it on the 
radio, I had to leave the room because they were dwelling on the injuries and 
the loss of life just more than, more than was necessary really and I just 
couldn't take it anymore, I would just burst into tears and I'd have to, I can't 
watch this anymore, I'd just had enough, I was filled with it all, but I think in the 
beginning they did a wonderful job (Melbourne –W: 342-350). 
I think as it is happening, I relied on it that was my sole knowledge.  Then once 
the tragedy had been broadcast I just felt that they were grandstanding and 
taking advantage and I really didn’t want to watch it any more (Regional Vic –C: 
277-280) 
According to Volo (2007) exaggerated and sensationalised reporting is commonplace and 
the impact on the tourism market is frequently out of proportion to the nature and extent 
of the actual damage caused. The comments among the intrastate participants regarding 
the sensationalism of the media demonstrate that they were in fact conscious of the 
media’s propensity to prolong a disaster’s intensity unnecessarily. The following comment 
from a regional interstate participant also signifies this opinion: 
...the commercial networks seemed to sensationalise what they were saying 
and I noticed after a while that they just kept repeating the ‘best’ scenes over 
and over again (Regional NSW – G: 443-446) 
Sydney participants commented that much of the information after the initial 48 hour 
period was both inconsistent and inaccurate across the various media sources, the common 
theme being a lack of information. There was general agreement within this group that they 
were not getting the entire story and the media was just giving them a concentrated view of 
the event – leaving critical elements out. These perceived gaps created a need within one 
respondent to seek information first hand from friends and relatives who live in Victoria as 
demonstrated by the following extract: 
... But it's just not a true picture in the sense that a lot of bits are missed out; 
it's just the sort of very concentrated view that we get, so that's my general 
feeling and I think that's why I also after the fires, I wanted to know, well hang 
on, now what really is happening down there, what is really going on, I wanted 
to ring my friends and say well exactly where is it and how bad is it cause I 
didn't really trust fully that I was getting the whole picture.... (Sydney-C: 283-
290) 
Given the context of the research, the focus group participants were asked to recall any 
news they had heard about the Gippsland region in the media coverage of the fires and 
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many could not recall anything about Gippsland specifically. In Sydney, participants were 
hazy about Gippsland’s boundaries and were not able to name any of the affected 
townships: 
I think it was Gippsland but they didn't name the suburbs so when I heard the 
suburbs I knew what they were talking about but I didn't go oh those suburbs 
are Gippsland, I just knew the Victorian bush area and they named the suburb 
which I was, became familiar with, yet which I've forgotten now but I didn't 
think that was part of the Gippsland area (Sydney –M: 177-182) 
One regional NSW participant was able to recall Wilson’s Promontory being affected, but 
again much of the focus in the media according to this group was the state of Victoria as 
opposed to specific regions. 
...sure Wilsons Promontory was mentioned, but I don't ever remember 
people saying that fires are raging through Gippsland or that particular area 
and I think a lot of people have got the idea that, whilst Gippsland boasts 
mountains, it's on the coastline and you don't expect the fires to be on the 
coastline as much as you can see them inland, forested areas and the like, so 
I don't believe I once heard the word Gippsland used in connection with 
those bush fires. (Regional NSW – G: 386-394) 
Regional Victoria participants were only able to recall the criminal investigation that 
surrounded the deliberately lit Gippsland fires, but they were able to recall specific town 
ships in Victoria that were affected, unlike NSW participants who had a broader 
understanding of where the fires were. Melbourne participants were able to make the most 
direct associations in terms of the exact locations and regions affected by the fires, and two 
participants spoke of Churchill and Wilsons Promontory. There was consensus however 
among the group that the Gippsland fires were somewhat overshadowed by areas that 
experienced significant loss of life, property land and wildlife: 
I suppose there wasn’t much coverage on the Gippsland fires as they were 
overshadowed. Fires in Gippsland were not really reported by local radio, 
after the fire it (Gippsland) got coverage but was again overshadowed by 
loss of life in King Lake and Marysville and places like that. Other areas were 
worse off (Melbourne –M: 200-205) 
One of the key findings in relation to the use of media in this study was the differences in 
the level of information and level of understanding in relation to the geographical proximity 
of the fires. This can potentially explain the NSW market’s misconception as to where the 
fires actually took place and consequently their perceptions of the region in its entirety. 
Glaesser (2006) refers to this particular effect as the ‘distance hypothesis’, according to 
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which geographical references to a destination become more facetted the closer it is. 
Support for this assumption was demonstrated by the unanimous decision by Sydney 
participants not to visit Gippsland at the time of the fires, despite the fact that only a few 
areas were affected. This is discussed later in the paper.  
Regarding participants’ media usage and interpretation, three key issues were raised. First, 
the level of information and understanding of the exact location of the fires appears to 
become blurred as the tourist’s geographical proximity to the event increases. Second, with 
the exception of the initial 48 hours of media coverage of the event, the level of trust in the 
media among the all participants was low – with some claiming it was over sensationalised 
and others (particularly those interstate) claiming there was a lack of information. Finally, 
despite the extent of damage and loss that occurred in the Gippsland region of Victoria, the 
bushfire events in surrounding Victorian regions such as Marysville and King Lake 
overshadowed the news of the Gippsland fires. The latter two findings may explain the 
surprisingly positive findings related to the Gippsland tourists’ subsequent destination 
image, as discussed in the following section. 
Destination Image 
It is becoming increasingly accepted that natural and man-made disasters have a 
devastating effect on the tourism industry with weakened or negative destination images 
often being a direct consequence of these events (Lehto et al, 2007). Previous studies by 
Pearlman and Melnik (2007), Scott, Laws and Prideaux (2007), Armstrong & Ritchie (2007) 
and Beirman (2003), have all presented scenarios where destinations have struggled to 
overcome prevailing destination images that have emerged as a result of an unforeseen 
disaster.  
To explore the image perceptions currently held by the Gippsland tourism market, 
participants were asked to describe how they feel about Gippsland as a tourism destination. 
This question was purposefully left until relatively late in the interview as it was anticipated 
that by this stage the participants would have had enough reflection on their thoughts and 
memories of the Gippsland fires to provide a valid representation of their resultant feelings 
towards the region. 
A large number of participants across the four groups gave reference to the destination’s 
diversity. Many from Melbourne described Gippsland as being scenic, accessible and 
offering a range of activity.  
I'm impressed with the range of activity and that beauty thing, it's more than 
just the scenery, it's like in close proximity you've got a completely wide 
cross section of Australia in Gippsland, other than the desert type area, it's 
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certainly got a lot to offer and it's close and accessible (Melbourne – L: 1251-
1255). 
Regional NSW participants also commented on the destination’s natural beauty and scenery 
while those from Sydney were also very complementary towards the destination: 
I think it's got the best features, it's beautiful and really lovely rural scenery, 
I love the green rolling hills, driving through there, the scenic drives it’s just, 
they’re just really very relaxing and you know there's something new to see 
around every corner, I love it, the art trails are just really interesting and the 
food, the food is fantastic there, and you know the best bush walking I have 
ever done (Sydney –C: 632 -639) 
Regional Victorian participants favoured the coastal regions of Gippsland, describing them 
as peaceful, pristine and isolated and emphasised the ‘country experience’. Interestingly, 
across all four groups there was not one mention by the participants of fire damage or ruin, 
when they were asked to talk how they feel about Gippsland, suggesting that the events of 
Black Saturday had little impact on their destination image.  
In contrast to the previous research, , these findings are consistent with those of Prideaux et 
al, (2007) whose study that investigated visitor expectations of a disaster struck destination 
found little to no change in terms of tourists’ expectations of the main attractors of the 
region post disaster. Gippsland is home to 12 of Victoria’s national parks, all of which form 
the basis of the region’s nature-based tourism product (Destination Gippsland, 2009). 
However, despite the wide spread news regarding the burning of one of Gippsland’s most 
popular natural attractions, (Wilson’s Promontory), the participants still referred to the 
region’s scenic natural resources as if nothing had changed or been touched by the fires. 
Further explanation for this response is offered by Gross and Peterson, (1987) who discuss 
the compensatory attitudes of consumers, claiming that a negative attribute of one product 
can often offset the positive attitudes of another. This is particularly relevant to the 
multifaceted tourism product. For example- the lack of five star accommodation in a 
location can be offset by the appeal of the natural surrounds, therefore resulting in a 
favourable attitude overall. In the current context, Gippsland’s diverse product offering may 
be powerful enough to overcome the negative image associations often linked with 
disastrous events. Support is also revealed for Morrison’s (2003) claim that touristic images 
are resistant to change and relatively persistent over time. 
A particular ‘image’ concern held by the Gippsland’s DMO in the wake of the bushfires was 
the level of risk their tourist market associated with visiting the destination and how safe 
they perceived the destination to be. In addition to the Black Saturday fires, the past five 
years have presented Gippsland with a number of large scale disasters, namely floods, 
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drought and bushfires. Information was sought to update our view on how tourists rated 
this destination as a ‘safe’ holiday option. 
In response to the question “Do you believe that Gippsland is a safe place to visit” there was 
no sense that participants felt in any way threatened by natural or any other kind of disaster 
in the region. The citation below from a regional Victorian participant exemplifies the kinds 
of responses that emerged from both interstate and intrastate participants: 
I don’t think of it as safe or unsafe.  It is not something that I really think 
about, to be honest.  It is not one of those things that comes to mind I 
suppose.  But if you are talking about going to the mountains in Peru, I 
would be worried about guerrilla attacks.  I wouldn’t be thinking about 
Gippsland as, “Oh my God, I am going to get burned and washed away”.  So 
it is not something that would really come to my mind if I was thinking about 
it (Regional Vic –C: 701-708). 
This comment, among others, indicated to the researchers that the Black Saturday bushfires 
had seemingly no influence on the tourism market’s perceptions of the safety of the 
destination. Across the tourism literature, there is a general acceptance that perceived 
safety has a significant influence on the tourist’s destination image formation (Sonmez and 
Graefe, 1998, Hall, Timothy and Duval, 2003; Crompton, 1979; Gartner and Hunt, 1987). The 
current research suggests that in the case of Gippsland, the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires 
has had minimal impact on the region’s destination image or its reputation as a safe place to 
visit. However, given recent claims that risk perceptions related to safety can predict travel 
intention (Floyd, Gibson, Pennington-Gray and Thapa, 2001), the researchers were also 
interested in the tourists’ willingness to travel to Gippsland at the time of or soon after the 
bushfires.  
Intentions to Travel 
As previously mentioned, Gippsland’s tourism industry suffered significant financial loss in 
the wake of the 2009 bushfires, most of which was put down to a steep decline in visitor 
numbers. Cancellations and a decline in visitation are described as two of the major 
symptoms of financial loss in the tourism sector when a destination is struck by disaster 
(Beirman, 2003; Glaesser, 2006; Huang et al., 2007). Examining the reasons why a service or 
a destination suffers loss of business post disaster can assist destination managers to 
understand one of the key challenges they face in the wake of a critical event (Scott et al. 
2007).  
To gain an appreciation of the tourism markets’ travel intentions on news of the disaster a 
hypothetical question was put forward to each group. The participants were asked if they 
had planned to travel to Gippsland at the time of the fires would they have still travelled to 
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the region, cancelled and gone elsewhere or postponed their travel to a later date. The 
responses across the four groups varied significantly with those that live in the regional 
areas being more prepared to go ahead with their plans, if possible, than those in the 
metropolitan areas.   
It was unanimous within the Sydney group that visiting the Gippsland region at the time of 
the fires was not an option. One participant however felt the need to help those in the fire 
affected region: 
I didn't want to go to Gippsland, I just didn't, I, it stops there and I did not 
want to go and then about three days later on the TV coverage they started 
saying we need you to come and visit, you know, we need people to come 
and then I sort of thought oh actually now I feel like I have to go (Sydney-S: 
252-257) 
There was a common belief among the Melbourne group that they would be in the way, 
intruding on local residents who were preoccupied with the recovery process: 
I'd have cancelled, yeah I'd go somewhere else, as for going there again, I 
went up to the Macedon on that Ash Wednesday, few days later and while I 
was up there I realised that you shouldn't be up there, they don't want you 
you’re no help, you're a hindrance, just, the shops don't want to serve you, 
they've all got things to do, you're a pest, so, you don't go (Melbourne, T: 
535-540) 
This comment from a Melbourne participant is demonstrative of Lehto et al’s (2007) finding 
that a visitor’s anticipation of an overwhelming recovery process can often deter their 
intention to re-patronise a destination. As is the following comment from the same group: 
Cancel it at that time because people had other things on their mind at 
that time, I mean they didn't need to have extra people around there 
(Melbourne - L: 411-414). 
Regional Victorian participants were generally prepared to still go ahead with the travel 
plans after seeking advice as to whether it was safe to visit. Only one participant stated they 
would not visit the region due to the fear of their young children being exposed to the 
devastation surrounding the fires and the fires themselves. One participant actually did visit 
the destination very soon after the fires and was able to reflect on their experience: 
We did have a holiday booked to Wilsons Promontory and we still did go.  I 
think it was about 24 February, which was just a couple of weeks after the 
main part of it.  We did ring up and just check that the area wasn’t affected 
by bushfires, that the accommodation was still okay because we knew there 
were fires at Wilsons Promontory and they assured us that everything was 
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fine and we still went and had our four days and it was really good (Regional 
Vic – C: 412-421)   
Regional Victorians were also driven by a need to support the tourism industry: 
I wouldn’t have gone out to make sure they were still standing basically but I 
would go because I remember seeing a lot on the news of businesses saying, 
“People, please people still come, we will lose our businesses as well as all 
our loss from the bushfires”.  So I would want to support their business and I 
would still go (Regional Vic –M:404-409) 
Participants from regional NSW were quite accepting of bushfires being a normal part of the 
Australian landscape and experience, and so were very open to the likelihood that they 
would go ahead with travel plans  
...If I was going for a holiday and the facilities were there I can't be thinking 
oh gosh if I go to Omeo I'm going to have the possibility of bush fires here, 
I've lived on the land, we've had bush fires come right up to our back door 
and we just accept it (Regional NSW–S: 649-653) 
This latter quotation lends support to previous research by Menfredo, Fishbein, Hass et al 
(1990) whose study suggested that direct experience with fire along with residency in rural 
areas can contribute to increased knowledge and heightened tolerance of fire. Further, past 
experience with such events has also been found to play an intervening role between news 
of an event and attitude formation towards the affected destination (Kroeber-Riel (1992, as 
sited in Glaesser, 2006).  
There appears to be a polarisation between metropolitan and regional responses to this 
question. Both regional groups, regardless of their proximity to the fires, were more 
prepared to visit the Gippsland region at the time of or soon after the events of Black 
Saturday, whilst the metropolitan groups appeared to display a greater degree of 
reluctance. The motives or drivers for visiting, the fire affected region at the time of or soon 
after the event however did provide some insight into the reasons behind their choice. For 
example, those from Melbourne were not enticed to visit the region as they felt they would 
be in the way of those in recovery, regional Victorian’s were motivated to visit the region to 
help the industry recover and those in regional NSW would still visit the region as a result of 
their familiarity with such events. Sydney participants on the other hand were quite 
unanimous in their decision not to visit the destination. Again the distance hypothesis may 
offer some explanation for the latter group’s decision not to travel, that is, their tendency to 
regionalise the event may have resulted in their assuming that the whole of Victoria was 
essentially a ‘no go’ zone.  
CONCLUSIONS 
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The aim of the focus group sessions was to examine the tourists’ responses to the 2009 
bushfires. Using four distinct geographical markets this research has identified the tourists’ 
interpretation, their subsequent destination image and intentions to travel to Gippsland at 
the time of or soon after the event, of each group. The findings suggest that despite the 
devastating impact this disaster had on the Gippsland tourism industry, their tourism 
market remains relatively loyal to the destination and their perceptions are unscathed. 
However, distinctions are made between the four geographical locations in terms of the 
participants’ interpretation of events and their travel intentions, which in turn offer a 
number of valuable implications for the tourism industry and those responsible for 
promoting the destination in the wake of a disastrous event. 
It has been implied that media coverage of a disastrous event has a significant impact on the 
tourist’s perceptions of the destination (Pearlman and Melnik, 2007; Prideaux et al, 2007). 
Whilst the current research did not aim to empirically test this association it did present a 
detailed account of the tourist’s interpretation of the media both during and after the 
events of Black Saturday. Overall, while participants’ perceptions of the locations and severity 
of bushfires were clearly influenced by the media they attended to, there was not a sense that 
people were conscientiously seeking information about the situation. Further, the under-
reporting of the Gippsland fires as a result of the media’s focus on the bushfire events in 
surrounding Victorian regions may potentially explain their maintained positive perceptions of 
the region. One of the key findings about media interpretations in this study however, was 
the distance effect demonstrated by those in Sydney, who, as a result of their 
misperceptions regarding the exact locations of the fires, were somewhat averse to visiting 
the region’s non-affected areas at the time of or soon after the event. To counter this effect, 
it is recommended that destination marketers provide concise information regarding the 
exact locality of the disaster affected areas and remain honest in their communications 
regarding suitability for tourist activity. As Glaesser (2006) claims, increasing distance from a 
disaster affected destination can be disadvantageous. If negative events are not precisely 
geographically defined, neighbouring regions who were not affected by the events can also 
suffer the negative consequences of those directly impacted. DMO’s, particularly when 
planning to communicate with their interstate and overseas markets, need to ensure that 
the media disassociates the specific towns they want to promote from the fire affected 
areas and encourage media to name townships as opposed to regions when reporting on 
fires or other disasters.  
Contrary to previous research surrounding disaster recovery marketing (see for example; 
Sanders, Laing and Houghton, 2008; Lehto, Douglas & Park,2007; Ritchie and Armstrong, 
2007) this study suggests that this particular disaster had little impact on the tourism 
market’s perceptions of Gippsland, with most participants describing the nature-based 
destination as if it were untouched. This result however must be treated with caution and 
consideration needs to be given to the fact that most of those who participated in the focus 
17 
 
groups had yet to return to the destination. It is recommended that while a DMO should 
remain honest about the state of the region throughout their post disaster marketing 
campaigns, DMO’s should also focus on the main attractors that were not affected by the 
fires in a bid to reaffirm people’s positive perceptions. Another marketing strategy that has 
been used to promote other Victorian fire affected destinations, such as the Grampians fires 
in 2006/7, focuses on the beauty of the regenerating landscape. According to Sanders et al., 
(2008) this marketing message leveraged off the public’s curiosity towards the regrowth of 
burnt areas. Given Gippsland’s nature-based product, this approach is also recommended to 
encourage visitation once regeneration commences. 
The willingness of some participants to visit the region during or soon after the fires is 
supportive of Carlsen and Liburd’s (2007) argument that destinations should be promoted 
during a crisis.  The current research suggests that a one size fits all marketing approach is 
far from adequate and a targeted marketing strategy is essential when promoting a 
destination believed to be in crisis. The findings indicated that Sydney residents were 
generally not willing to visit the region at the time of the fires and it was assumed that this 
could be explained by their lack of knowledge of the exact locations of the fires. Therefore, 
when targeting the interstate market, the region’s DMO should refer to the non-affected 
areas by their town names as opposed to promoting them under the region’s umbrella 
brand. By disassociating the non- affected areas within the region presumed to be ablaze, 
the DMO is assisting neighbouring towns unaffected by the disaster to avoid the 
unnecessary losses that often occur as a result of their brand association with the region 
(Glaesser, 2006). 
The strong empathetic theme that emerged from the regional focus groups suggests that 
DMO’s should initially target regional segments that are motivated to visit a disaster 
affected destination by the need to support and assist the recovery process, where that is 
practical in terms of tourist operations and infrastructure. It is recommended that  an ‘open 
for business’ style campaign with an empathetic style message that portrays the community 
as being ready and willing to receive visitors be employed. The literature indicates that 
marketing responses that inform tourists of the region being open for business and which 
focuses on positive outcomes such as community spirit, restoration and limited loss of 
attractions, can help to limit the contagion effect of a disaster by providing a clear message 
for the tourism industry (Hystad and Keller,2008). Honesty and openness about the general 
state of the destination are also important elements of any recovery marketing campaign as 
they are said to assist in the eradication of any misconceptions created by the media and 
help the destination to establish a reputation for reliability and trust among its intended 
tourism market (Armstrong and Ritchie, 2007; Beirman, 2006). 
In summary, this research has provided insight into the perceptions held by the Gippsland 
tourism market in the wake of the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires. The findings revealed in 
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the study have contributed to the tourism literature and presented practical implications in 
relation to post disaster perceptions and suggestions for recovery marketing. Cross 
application of the findings however should be regarded with caution, as the focus groups 
were specifically conducted to examine the Australian tourism market’s response to 2009 
Black Saturday bushfires. Care also needs to be taken in the generalising these findings 
given the targeted nature of the study.  
Future research is needed to reaffirm the findings presented in the paper and to empirically 
measure the impact of natural disasters and the subsequent media coverage on the broader 
community’s perceptions of disaster affected tourism destinations. Research that reveals 
the most effective marketing communications media post disaster is also needed to inform 
those responsible for recovery marketing campaigns and execution. Communication plays 
an integral role in destination recovery during and after a crisis or disaster and a 
comprehensive marketing communication strategy ensures DMOs can be proactive and 
prepared, rather than applying a cost inefficient knee jerk response, based on assumptions 
that may be invalid.  
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Victoria’s Gippsland Region: Source: Tourism Victoria web page (1 Oct 2009) 
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